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Essay 
Burying Evidence’s Dead Hand 
Matthew D. Provencher* 
ABSTRACT 
When the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence were adopted, they 
displaced all inconsistent case law existing at the time.  Though the 
Rules retain a great deal of the evidence practice that preceded them, 
there is much in evidence practice that changed with their adoption.  
Rhode Island courts have consistently applied Rule 403 in a manner 
that comports with practice as it existed before the enactment of the 
Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.  That practice, though, is 
inconsistent with the plain language of the Rule.  These doctrines 
must be discarded. 
INTRODUCTION 
Law reform is a hard business.  It took more than a century for 
American pleading and practice to complete codification efforts 
begun by David Dudley Field, II, in the mid-nineteenth century.1  
Evidence reform proceeded along similar paths, but took even 
longer at both the state and federal levels.2  Rhode Island’s work, 
as we will see, remains incomplete.  What happens when old 
 
 *  Matthew D. Provencher is a 2015 graduate of Roger Williams 
University School of Law, and an attorney in private practice in Providence, 
Rhode Island.  The views expressed here are the author’s alone. 
 1. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1002 at 9–17 (4th ed. 2015).  
 2. See generally Eleanor Swift, One Hundred Years of Evidence Law 
Reform: Thayer’s Triumph, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2437 (2000). 
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precedents survive the adoption of a new code?  The hand of the 
past pushes the law in directions opposite to those intended by 
reforming jurisdictions.  And in Rhode Island, that dead hand has 
pushed courts into misstating the law of one particular rule of 
evidence.  Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence is 
consistently applied by courts in a way that typifies the ad hoc and 
case-specific evidentiary rulings of the past, a pattern at odds with 
the purpose of codified evidentiary rules.  The application of these 
doctrines is an error of law that the bench and bar should put a stop 
to. 
THE BACKGROUND OF CODIFICATION EFFORTS 
Rhode Island codified its evidence law a little over a decade 
after the United States Congress did the same for federal courts.3 
The Supreme Court of the United States originally sought to 
promulgate federal rules of evidence under the power granted to it 
by the Rules Enabling Act.4  That statute, which created the unified 
federal procedural structure we now take for granted, eliminated 
the cumbersome process dictated by the Conformity Act of 1872 and 
marks the point at which modern practice began to take shape.5 
Rhode Island had its own mid-century law reform movement 
that paralleled federal efforts.  First, in 1966, Rhode Island practice 
underwent a revolution similar to the one caused by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure when the adoption of the Rhode Island 
Rules of Civil Procedure.6  Shortly after this procedural reform was 
accomplished, the Supreme Court of the United States shifted its 
focus to evidence reform, and sought to complete its codification 
efforts in 1972.7 
In the heady atmosphere of the Watergate scandal, though, 
Congress was unwilling to let the Supreme Court effect wholesale 
changes to evidence without the opportunity for input, specifically 
 
 3. The Rhode Island Supreme Court created the Rhode Island Rules of 
Evidence on July 23, 1987, twelve years after Congress enacted the Federal 
Rules of Evidence in 1975.  See Order, In re Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, 
No. 0915e (R.I. July 23, 1987).  The General Assembly later passed a law 
codifying the Rules of Evidence.  See 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-42 (2012). 
 4. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77 (2012). 
 5. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, at 9–12.  
 6. Robert B. Kent, Rhode Island Interest: Rhode Island Civil Procedure—
Some Problems, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 429, 429 n.2 (2004). 
 7. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 n.7 (1996). 
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regarding the issue of evidentiary privileges.8  Following 
procedures set forth in the Rules Enabling Act, Congress passed a 
law staying the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and then 
revised and passed the Rules as legislation, which was ultimately 
signed into law by President Gerald Ford.9 
Not long after, Rhode Island embarked on its own evidence 
reforms.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court convened an advisory 
committee in 1980, the work of which led to the final adoption of 
the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence in 1987.10  Though the Rhode 
Island General Assembly passed an enabling act empowering civil 
procedure reform, the creation of the Rules of Evidence would take 
a different path.11  Rather than promulgating the Rules of Evidence 
through powers conferred by an enabling act, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court promulgated its Rules of Evidence through the 
general power conferred upon it by the General Assembly and 
through the Supreme Court’s inherent constitutional and 
supervisory powers.12 
 Though the General Assembly did not seize control of evidence 
codification in the way Congress did, it played its own part. It 
sought to legislatively enshrine the conclusion that the new rules of 
evidence wholly displaced previous practice, wherever and 
whenever they might be inconsistent: “The rules of evidence as 
adopted by the Rhode Island [S]upreme [C]ourt shall be controlling 
and take precedence over any statutory or case law in effect at the 
time of the adoption that is inconsistent with the Rhode Island rules 
of evidence.”13  This language mirrors a provision of the federal 
Rules Enabling Act.14 
And yet, case law inconsistent with the Rules of Evidence 
continues to hold precedential value in Rhode Island courts today.  
 
 8. To understand why evidentiary privileges were of particular interest 
to Congress at that exact moment, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 
703–16 (1974). 
 9. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 935 n.9 (1983). 
 10. ERIC D. GREEN & ROBERT G. FLANDERS, JR., RHODE ISLAND EVIDENCE 
MANUAL xxv (2005) [hereinafter RHODE ISLAND EVIDENCE MANUAL]. 
 11. See 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-6-2(a) (2008). 
 12. Order, In re Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, No. 0915e (R.I. July 23, 
1987). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (“All laws in conflict with [the federal rules of 
procedure and evidence] shall be of no further force or effect after such rules 
have taken effect.”). 
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Rule 403 is widely recognized as a critical component of evidence 
law, one so important that it cuts across all other rules of 
evidence.15  By its own familiar terms, Rule 403 requires the 
exclusion of evidence that, though of some probative value, finds 
that value substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice which would inure to a party by its admission.16 
The goal of codification was to create a uniform, predictable, 
accessible, consistent, and rational statement of the law.17  The 
product of the advisory committee’s efforts to meet those goals led 
to the text of the rule.  Rule 403 is a general rule; it does not contain 
a list of exemplar scenarios, such as the exceptions to hearsay,18 
nor does it apply to only a narrow category of evidence.19  It is 
intended to be applied in the same manner across all 
circumstances.  But it is undercut in two ways that sap its vitality 
in cases where it is most closely at issue. 
RULE 403 AND CRIME SCENE PHOTOGRAPHY 
The application of Rhode Island’s Rule 403 is modified in one 
particular context: crime scene photography.  Crime scene 
photographs or video, especially those of murder victims or the 
victims of other violent crimes, have their own rules for admission.  
Rhode Island courts apply two tests when evaluating the 
admissibility of crime scene photographs.20  First, “with respect to 
highly prejudicial crime-scene photographs or pictures of murder 
victims, [the Rhode Island Supreme] Court has consistently held 
that ‘when such evidence is probative, the trial court’s admission of 
explicit photographs is not an abuse of discretion and will not be 
disturbed on appeal.’”21  These holdings are not the result of general 
 
 15. State v. Gaspar, 982 A.2d 140, 147–48 (R.I. 2009).  
 16. R.I. R. EVID. 403. 
 17. See RHODE ISLAND EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 10, at xxvii–xxviii 
(discussing codification objectives and inconsistent nature of evidence rulings 
prior to adoption of rules). 
 18. See R.I. R. EVID. 803, 804. 
 19. See, e.g., R.I. R. EVID. 404(b), 609. 
 20. See, e.g., State v. Patel, 949 A.2d 401, 412–13 (R.I. 2008); State v. 
O’Brien, 774 A.2d 89, 107 (R.I. 2001).  “It is only evidence that is marginally 
relevant and enormously prejudicial that must be excluded.  Because ‘the 
ultimate determination of the effect of evidence lies in the discretion of the trial 
justice,’ we will not disturb such a determination on appeal absent an abuse of 
discretion.”  Patel, 949 A.2d at 412–13 (internal citations omitted). 
 21. O’Brien, 774 A.2d at 107 (quoting Hughes v. State, 656 A.2d 971, 972 
(R.I. 1995)). 
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or waived objections; the Court has applied these doctrines to direct 
challenges under Rule 403.22  Second, when confronted with crime 
scene photographs, Rhode Island law requires an inquiry into the 
proponent’s purpose for offering the evidence: “‘Indeed, only when 
such evidence is offered solely to inflame the passions of the jury 
should a photograph’ or other visual images of a crime victim be 
excluded.”23 
These two doctrines conflict with Rule 403 in several ways.  For 
starters, there is no balancing under either standard.  The relative 
weights of probative value and unfair prejudice are never assessed, 
nor compared against each other.  The first test essentially reduces 
a two-step balancing test to a one-step inquiry: does the photograph 
or video have probative value?  If it does, then the evidence is 
admissible.24  Balancing does not appear to be necessary at all; so 
long as there is probative value, a trial judge’s decision to admit the 
evidence cannot be wrong.25 
The second test departs from examining the evidence on its 
own merits entirely.  This intent-focused inquiry bears no 
resemblance to the careful balancing and weighing that Rule 403 
calls for.  Instead, a trial judge must look at the evidence and try to 
divine the mind of the evidence’s proponent, asking whether they 
offer the evidence for the sole purpose of unduly influencing the 
jury.26  This second test effectively turns an evidentiary issue into 
a Batson challenge in miniature.27  It shifts the reviewing court’s 
focus from the evidence to the proponent; it asks about intent, 
rather than the balance between probative value and unfair 
prejudice; it requires a judge to scry the motives in a lawyer’s heart 
rather than assess evidence. 
 
 22. See State v. Garcia, 140 A.3d 133, 144–45 (R.I. 2016); see also O’Brien, 
774 A.2d at 106–07. 
 23. O’Brien, 774 A.2d at 107 (emphasis in original). 
 24. Hughes, 656 A.2d at 972. 
 25. See State v. Fry, 130 A.3d 812, 830 (R.I. 2016) (discussing trial judge’s 
findings of probative value without mention of possible unfair prejudice); see 
also id. at 832 (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (“It does not appear from the record 
that the trial justice articulated, either expressly or impliedly, the balancing 
test required by Rule 403.”).  
 26. O’Brien, 774 A.2d at 107. 
 27. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986) (establishing the 
test to examine peremptory challenges of jurors for discriminatory intent). 
322 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 24:317 
THE DOCTRINAL ORIGINS OF THE RULE 
These special tests for crime scene photographs and videos are 
an anomaly.  It does not appear that any other types of evidence 
have unique, case-made rules that contravene the Rhode Island 
Rules of Evidence.  Nor do any other categories of evidence have 
extratextual tests that modify the application of relevant Rules of 
Evidence by omitting part of the text, which happens here with the 
elision of the balancing half of the Rule 403 test.  Nor does it appear 
that judicial evaluation of any other evidentiary issue necessitates 
inquiry into the mental state or motive of the proponent of the 
evidence.  Why, exactly, does this one narrow species of evidence 
have such an individualized rule? 
There appear to be two independent sources, which have been 
synthesized in modern decisions into the full rule.  The first line of 
cases, which created the substance of the rule in which crime scene 
photographs or videos are only assessed for relevance and probative 
value, not potential for unfair prejudice, appears to trace back 
nearly a century in Rhode Island case law.28  By 1971 the rule was 
well settled in a form easily recognizable to modern practitioners: 
“[W]here a photograph constitutes competent evidence and 
reasonably tends to prove or disprove some material facts in issue, 
it is admissible in evidence even though it may have an influence 
beyond the strict limits of the purpose for which it was admitted.”29  
The rule is applied in essence the same today.30 
The second half of the equation, the “sole purpose” language, 
appears to have its origins in a case decided about twenty years 
before the adoption of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.  State v. 
Winston involved, as many crime scene photograph cases do, a 
particularly gruesome and terrible crime.31  Police responded to a 
home in southern Providence at 1:38 a.m. on Christmas morning; 
inside, they found the body of a two and one-half year-old girl.32  
She had been stabbed, and there was visible evidence of a sexual 
 
 28. See State v. Greene, 60 A.2d 711, 715 (R.I. 1948); see also State v. 
Miller, 161 A. 222, 224 (R.I. 1932). 
 29. State v. Danahey, 274 A.2d 736, 741 (R.I. 1971). 
 30. See Fry, 130 A.3d at 831 (“[T]his Court has consistently held that ‘when 
such evidence . . . is probative, the trial court’s admission of explicit 
photographs is not an abuse of discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal.’” 
(quoting State v. Carter, 744 A.2d 839, 847 (R.I. 2000))).  
 31. 252 A.2d 354, 355 (R.I. 1969).  
 32. Id.  
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assault.33 
The victim’s seven-year-old brother notified police that a 
neighbor, who lived just four houses down the street, had been at 
the house the night before.34  That neighbor was brought into police 
headquarters, where he admitted to returning to the victim’s home 
after midnight and committing the sexual assault and murder.35  
At trial, he sought to preclude the admission of crime scene and 
autopsy photographs showing the condition of the victim.36  The 
trial court did not agree with him and admitted the photos.37 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge.38 
It recited the various ways in which such photographs possess 
probative value: 
proof of the corpus delicti, the extent of injury, the 
condition and identification of the body or for their bearing 
on the question of the degree of atrociousness of the crime, 
even though such photographs may tend to have an 
influence beyond the strict limits for which they were 
introduced.39 
The court then looked at the photos for their prejudicial effect: “We 
have examined the photographs in dispute and find them not to be 
as offensive as they are portrayed by defendant.”40  This 
examination should be familiar—it presages, without using the 
same terms, the analysis called for by Rule 403.  The seed of the 
change comes after this substantive discussion: “[w]hile this court 
will not countenance the use of photographs whose sole purpose is 
to inflame a jury, defendant has failed to show us that the use of 
the disputed evidence amounted to an abuse of the trial justice’s 
discretion.”41 
This statement comes after the discussion on the merits of the 
case and is not essential to the court’s holding—it is not 
precedential.42  The adoption of this dictum as a new substantive 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 356. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 356–57. 
 42. See Obiter Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (“A judicial 
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rule of law was not long in coming, though.  By 1972 the court, in 
State v. Pombo, was already applying it as the determinative test, 
stating that “[t]he defendant has failed to persuade us that the sole 
purpose of offering this photo into evidence was to inflame the 
jury[.]”43  And a definite shift is apparent: in Winston, the court is 
saying that it would not accept evidence offered solely to inflame 
the jury; in Pombo, the court is saying that it will only exclude 
evidence if it is solely offered to inflame the jury.  This is the 
transformation of a sufficient condition into a necessary one. The 
tests were thus settled in their current forms before the creation of 
the Rules of Evidence. 
THE ADOPTION OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE 
The Rhode Island Rules of Evidence were adopted on October 
1, 1987.44  The General Assembly simultaneously made several 
previous statutory provisions dealing with evidence self-repealing 
on the date of the adoption of the rules.45  And it included a new 
provision, passed to coincide with the adoption of the rules: “The 
rules of evidence as adopted by the Rhode Island supreme court  
shall be controlling and take precedence over any statutory or case 
law in effect at the time of the adoption that is inconsistent with 
the Rhode Island rules of evidence.”46 
The two rules for crime scene photographs are plainly 
inconsistent with the text of the rule.  Rule 403 requires a trial court 
to weigh probative value against the potential for unfair 
prejudice.47  The case law on crime scene photography evidence 
varies substantially from the Rule 403 balancing test in the two 
ways described above.  The substantive elements accept crime 
scene photographs when they are relevant and probative, without 
any regard to unfair prejudice; there is no balancing, as the rule 
requires.  And the intent inquiry has no basis in the text of the rule 
 
comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary 
to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be 
considered persuasive).”).  
 43. 290 A.2d 855, 857 (R.I. 1972) (citing Winston, 252 A.2d 354, 354 (R.I. 
1969).  
 44. Order, In re Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, No. 0915e (R.I. July 23, 
1987). 
 45. See id.  9 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19-16–18, repealed by P.L. 1987, ch. 381, 
§ 7; cf. RHODE ISLAND EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 10, at xvi n.2.  
 46. Id. § 9-19-42.  
 47. R.I. R. EVID. 403. 
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at all.  Rule 403, by its very terms, assumes that there is a proper 
basis for introducing the evidence.  That is why it “cuts across” all 
other rules of evidence: it applies to evidence that would otherwise 
be admissible but still should not be admitted because of 
extraordinary circumstances.48 
The case law is inconsistent with the Rule, and a statute 
precludes reliance on those two earlier tests.  They must, then, give 
way to the text of Rule 403.  But that has not happened. There do 
not appear to be any reported cases analyzing the impact of section 
9-19-42 of the Rhode Island General Laws on this evidence doctrine.  
In fact, there are few reported decisions that even cite that 
statute.49  The Rhode Island Supreme Court has, though, 
recognized the force of section 9-19-42 previously, and used it to 
eliminate reliance on inconsistent decisions predating the Rules of 
Evidence for expert testimony.50  It seems evident that reliance on 
case law predating—and inconsistent with—the Rules of Evidence 
is misplaced. 
PUTTING A GLOSS ON THE RULE? 
If the Rule is inconsistent with existing case law, prior 
decisions must give way to the Rule, and the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court has said as much.  But can the Rhode Island Supreme Court, 
as the font of authority for the Rules of Evidence, diverge from the 
text of the Rule on its own initiative, essentially re-adopting former 
law by implication?  While the court likely possesses the 
constitutional authority to do so, a recent decision suggests that the 
court would (and should) refuse to do so. 
The Rhode Island Rules of Evidence were not, as noted above, 
 
 48. See State v. Gaspar, 982 A.2d 140, 147–48 (R.I. 2009). 
 49. A search of reported Rhode Island decisions reveals just three Rhode 
Island Supreme Court cases addressing the statute: Flanagan v. Wesselhoeft, 
712 A.2d 365, 369 (R.I. 1998); Owens v. Payless Cashways, Inc., 670 A.2d 1240, 
1243 (R.I. 1996); and Martinez v. Kurdziel, 612 A.2d 669, 673 (R.I. 1992). 
 50. Flanagan, 712 A.2d at 369. 
By virtue of § 9-19-42, Rule 702 took “precedence over any statutory 
or case law in effect at the time of its adoption” that was “inconsistent 
with the Rhode Island [R]ules of [E]vidence.”  Rule 702 effectively has 
served to trump Richardson [v. Fuchs, 523 A.2d 445 (R.I. 1987)], 
Young [v. Park, 417 A.2d 889 (R.I. 1980)], and Schenck [v. Roger 
Williams Gen. Hosp., 382 A.2d 514 (R.I. 1977)], all relied upon by the 
trial justice for her exclusion of Dr. Brand’s deposition testimony. 
Id. 
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promulgated under enabling legislation passed by the General 
Assembly.51  The law governing the Rules of Civil Procedure, 
section 8-6-2(a) of the Rhode Island General Laws, grants the power 
to amend those rules, but distributes that power across the 
courts.52  The members of each bench may vote on rules of 
procedure, and then submit them to the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court for final approval.53  No such procedure is required by any 
statute for the Rules of Evidence.  As the supreme court relied on 
the broad supervisory authority it holds by law from the General 
Assembly, augmented by the inherent constitutional power it holds 
as the state supreme court, there does not appear to be any required 
procedure for amending the rules. 
If the court desired, it likely could amend the rules on its own 
initiative, even by decision.  But the court has firmly stated that it 
recognizes prudential limits on the exercise of its plenary power, 
and specifically will not seek to vary from a plain language 
interpretation of a rule.  Cashman Equipment Corp., Inc. v. Cardi 
Corp., Inc. presents the unenviable scenario where practice norms 
diverge from the text of a rule.54  The dispute centered on work 
performed in constructing the Sakonnet River Bridge.  The 
particular issue before the court was the discoverability of computer 
models and draft reports used by the defendant’s expert in the 
course of formulating his opinion.55  The trial court denied a motion 
to compel discovery, holding that it was constrained in this scenario 
by the Rules of Civil Procedure.56 
The plaintiff, the party seeking discovery, offered a 
comprehensive argument indicating that general practice saw the 
materials sought as discoverable, and that the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure made the material discoverable.57  The defendant 
responded, however, that Rhode Island’s rule varied in its text from 
the federal rule; it allowed only for expert discovery via 
interrogatories or depositions of the expert themselves—not the 
 
 51. Order, In re Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, No. 0915e (R.I. July 23, 
1987) (“The rules are promulgated pursuant to the powers conferred upon this 
Court by G.L. 1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 8-1-2, and also pursuant to its 
constitutional and inherent powers.”). 
 52. 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-6-2(a). 
 53. Id.  
 54. 139 A.3d 379 (R.I. 2016). 
 55. Id. at 380. 
 56. Id. at 381. 
 57. Id.  
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discovery of underlying documentation.58  Because the language of 
the Rule of Civil Procedure was plain and unambiguous, the end 
result was inescapable: the material was not discoverable.59  More 
important here, the court acknowledged the basic premise of the 
plaintiff’s argument—that the court should read the rule to include 
what it was seeking as a practical concession—and rejected it 
outright.  “To determine otherwise would require this Court to alter 
the present rule by judicial fiat, a practice in which we will not 
engage.”60 
The court did rest its decision in part upon the amendment 
procedure for the Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a vote of 
the members of the relevant court, as described above, precluding 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court from acting unilaterally.61  But it 
nonetheless began its discussion by stating emphatically what it 
considers to be prudential limits on the exercise of its powers.  The 
court’s position on rule changes is sensible and absolute: it will not 
do so absent an appropriate process, and it will not decree new rules 
on its own accord.62  We are left here: statutory authority forecloses 
judicial reliance on common law doctrine inconsistent with the 
Rules of Evidence, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court has a 
strong institutional preference against unilateral action to vary the 
text of its rules. 
JUST THE TEXT 
“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.”63  This is the appropriate test 
to apply to an evidentiary challenge under Rule 403.  This test does 
 
 58. Id. at 382. 
 59. Id. at 383. 
 60. Id. (citing Capital Props. Inc. v. City of Providence, 843 A.2d 456, 460 
(R.I. 2004)). 
 61. Id. at 383 (“As Cardi points out, the process for amending the Superior 
Court Rules of Civil Procedure is provided by statute.”). 
 62. In the evidence context, this process would likely repeat the convening 
of an advisory committee, which then investigates case law and the impacts of 
the rules and then proffers revisions to the Rhode Island Supreme Court for 
review and finalization.  See RHODE ISLAND EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 10, 
at xxv-xxvi, xxvii-xxix. 
 63. R.I. R. EVID. 403. 
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not countenance evaluating crime scene photographs only in terms 
of relevance and probative value, nor does it turn upon an inquiry 
into the intent animating an evidentiary proffer. The other 
doctrines cannot lawfully be applied to cases in light of section 9-
19-42, as that statute “effectively [serves] to trump” them.64 
This change will not lead to upheaval in the courts.  “It is only 
evidence that is marginally relevant and enormously prejudicial 
that must be excluded.”65  No defendant is entitled to a “sanitized 
version of the state’s evidence against him.”66  And trial judges are 
well aware that the discretion afforded to them to exclude evidence 
under Rule 403 must be exercised sparingly.67 The proper 
application of the Rule 403 balancing test will not disrupt the mine 
run of cases, as it should not. 
Granted, the stakes, in terms of practical effect, are low.  This 
will not be a sea change in the law, revolutionizing criminal practice 
in the state.  But in every case, courts should apply the law as it 
exists, and not be contented with uncritically applying the dead 
doctrines of the past.  What matters is that the test as applied is 
not the law.  If the legal profession can be said to have any basic 
duty, it is the duty to accurately state the law.  
Beyond this fundamental concern, the application of these tests 
frustrates the intention of the rule.  Application of old and 
superseded law can, and does, lead to courts resolving Rule 403 
challenges on discarded doctrine rather than on the plain text of the 
Rules of Evidence.68  The two collateral doctrines make it all too 
easy to elide the rule as written and apply judicial innovations 
rather than the text upon which the bench and bar are supposed to 
rely.  Reliance on these tests distorts outcomes in a way that 
 
 64. Flanagan v. Wesselhoeft, 712 A.2d 365, 369 (R.I. 1998). 
 65. State v. Patel, 949 A.2d 401, 412–13 (R.I. 2008). 
 66. State v. Pona, 66 A.3d 454, 468 (R.I. 2013). 
 67. State v. Virola, 115 A.3d 980, 996 (R.I. 2015) (citing State v. Brown, 42 
A.3d 1239, 1244 (R.I. 2012)). 
 68. See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 140 A.3d 133, 144–45 (R.I. 2016) (holding 
autopsy photographs admissible under Rule 403 because they are 
“‘unquestionably relevant’” without weighing possibility of unfair prejudice); 
State v. Fry, 130 A.3d 812, 830 (R.I. 2016) (“[W]e cannot conclude that the video 
was offered ‘solely to inflame the passions of the jury[,]’ as would be required 
to prevent its admission.” (quoting State v. O’Brien, 774 A.2d 89, 107 (R.I. 
2001))); State v. Brown, 88 A.3d 1101, 1121 (R.I. 2014) (“We are unable to 
conclude that the trial justice abused his discretion when he ruled that the 
state did not present these photographs solely to inflame the passions of the 
jury . . . .”). 
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diverges from the Rules of Evidence, defeating their purpose.  It is 
difficult to envision a scenario in which a crime scene photograph 
would be irrelevant, or one in which surrounding circumstances 
would offer sufficient proof of a prosecutor’s improper intent.  It is 
not just that the doctrines continue to exist after the adoption of the 
Rules of Evidence, it is that they tear the heart out of one of the 
most important of them. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court promulgated its Rules of 
Evidence on October 1, 1987.69  Since then, the dead hand of old 
law has prevented the Rules from operating as they should.  The 
bench and bar should take the opportunity to recognize this fact 
and challenge the application of this disavowed precedent.  If the 
extratextual evidence doctrines applied by Rhode Island courts are 
to be preserved, they should be formally added to a revised edition 
of the Rules of Evidence; rewriting rules by judicial fiat is 
something the Rhode Island Supreme Court strenuously refuses to 
do.  Notwithstanding its aversion to doing so, that revision by fiat 
is exactly what has been happening to Rule 403.  The proper means 
to preserve these doctrines is to convene an advisory committee to 
recommend rule revisions to the Supreme Court. But until and 
unless that happens, the Rules of Evidence must mean exactly what 
they say, and no more or less. 
 
 69. Order, In re Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, No. 0915e (R.I. July 23, 
1987). 
